U.S. Navy engineer, wife charged with selling submarine secrets to an unidentified foreign country

A U.S. Navy nuclear engineer and his wife have been charged with selling secret information about nuclear submarines to an undercover FBI agent who posed as an operative for a foreign country, the Justice Department said on Sunday. 

In a criminal complaint detailing espionage-related charges against Jonathan Toebbe, 42, and his wife Diana, 45, the government said he sold information for nearly the past year to a foreign power representative.   

The FBI says in April 2020 Toebbe sent a package of Navy documents to a foreign government and wrote that he was interested in selling information on Virginia-class nuclear submarine reactors.

The unidentified foreign government sat on the documents before turning them over to the US in December 2020, after the election.       

Toebbe was arrested in West Virginia on Saturday along with his wife, a teacher, after he had placed a removable memory card at a prearranged ‘dead drop’ in the state, according to the Justice Department. 

He hid encrypted memory cards a peanut butter sandwich, a chewing gum packet and band-aid wrapper. 

Toebbe worked for 15 months in the office of the chief of naval operations, the top officer in the military’s branch.  

He has worked on naval nuclear propulsion since 2012, including secret technology devised to reduce the noise and vibration of submarines, factors that can give away their location.

Toebbe stated in one message that he had hoped the foreign government would be able to extract him and his family if he was ever tracked down, saying ‘we have passports and cash set aside for this purpose.’

Authorities say he provided instructions for how to conduct the furtive relationship, with a letter that said: ‘I apologize for this poor translation into your language. Please forward this letter to your military intelligence agency. I believe this information will be of great value to your nation. This is not a hoax.’

An undercover FBI agent posing as a representative of the foreign government made contact with Toebbe and agreed to pay thousands of dollars in cryptocurrency for the information he was offering.   

The emails show that at first Toebbe remained wary but that he came to trust the undercover agent due to the hefty amount he was going to be paid. It was agreed he would receive $100,00 in crypto and was paid $70,000 before he was caught. 

The FBI also arranged a ‘signal’ to Toebbe from the country’s embassy in Washington over the Memorial Day weekend. The papers do not describe how the FBI was able to arrange such a signal.  

In June 2021, the FBI says, the undercover agent sent $10,000 in cryptocurrency to Toebbe, describing it as a sign of good faith and trust.

Weeks later, federal agents watched as the Toebbes arrived at an agreed-upon location in West Virginia for the exchange, with Diana Toebbe appearing to serve as a lookout for her husband during a dead-drop operation for which the FBI paid $20,000, according to the complaint.   

The FBI recovered a blue memory card wrapped in plastic and placed between two slices of bread on a peanut butter sandwich, court documents said.

The FBI provided the contents of the memory card to a Navy subject matter expert who determined that the records included design elements and performance characteristics of Virginia-class submarine reactors, the Justice Department said.

The FBI conducted similar dead-drop exchanges over the next several months, including one in August in Virginia in which Toebbe was paid roughly $70,000 and concealed in a chewing gum package a memory card that contained schematic designs for the Virginia-class submarine, according to court documents. 

One memory card included a typed message that said, in part: ‘I hope your experts are very happy with the sample provided and I understand the importance of a small exchange to grow our trust.’

Many of the emails that were exchanged between Toebbe and the representative of the foreign country were transcribed in the court documents. He used two pseudonyms: Alice Hill and Bob Burns.

The messages suggest that Toebbe was offering the classified information to a power that already has nuclear submarines.     

Toebbe states in one message that the information ‘reflects decades of U.S. Navy ‘lessons learned’ that will help keep your sailors safe.’

Only six countries currently operate nuclear-powered submarines — China, France, India, Russia, the UK and the US. The US and UK are set to provide Australia with the technology to deploy nuclear-powered submarines, as part of the first initiative under the new trilateral security partnership AUKUS.  

Prior to the new deal, which ignited a diplomatic row between Washington and Paris, the US had only shared the technology of its submarines with Britain. Each of these underwater craft costs an estimated $3billion to build.

According to public Navy records, he worked for 15 months in the office of the chief of naval operations, the top officer in the military’s branch. 

Since 2012, Toebbe has worked for the Navy and he had high-level clearances in nuclear engineering.   

Toebbe started working in the military as a civilian in 2017. He was commissioned in the Navy and rose to the rank of lieutenant before moving to the Navy Rescue, which he left in December 2020 — the month the FBI established contact with him. 

According to court documents, he has worked on naval nuclear propulsion since 2012, including on technology devised to reduce the noise and vibration of submarines, factors that can give away their location.

He also worked on naval reactors in Arlington, Virginia, from 2012 to 2014. He then was a student at naval reactor school in Pittsburgh before returning to Arlington to work on reactors again. 

The complaint alleges violations of the Atomic Energy Act, which restricts the disclosure of information related to atomic weapons or nuclear materials.

 It is unclear how many counts the couple, who have two children and live in Annapolis, Maryland, face. However, espionage carries a maximum sentence of ten years under US law.

Diana Toebbe is a humanities teacher at the Key School, a private school in Annapolis. The K-12 school said on Sunday that she had been suspended indefinitely.        

The Toebbes are expected to have their initial court appearances Tuesday in Martinsburg, West Virginia. 

No one answered at the Toebbe residence on Sunday afternoon in a waterside Annapolis community by the South River. 

An outside light was on above the door of their home, and a dog barked inside.

John Cooley, who lives across the street from the Toebes, said he counted more than 30 FBI agents on his block on Saturday from about 2.30 p.m. until after dark. He said agents went inside the home.  

Jerry LaFleur, a neighbor of the Toebbes, said he would occasionally waive to the Toebbes, but the only time they spoke was when to ask permission to trim the weeds on the family’s side of the backyard fence they share.

‘He seemed like a nice, ordinary guy, nothing that would make me think twice,’ Mr. LaFleur said.  

It wasn’t immediately clear whether the Toebbes, who are from Annapolis, Maryland, have lawyers. The Navy declined to comment to the Associated Press on Sunday. 

The Toebbe’s arrest has already been compared to Jonathan Pollard, a former US intelligence analyst who served 30 years in jail for selling navy secrets to Israel. 

He is the only American in US history to receive a life sentence for spying for an ally, and the only one to serve more than 10 years in prison for the crime. 

Both, Diana and Jonathan Toebbe are scheduled to appear in a West Virginia federal court on Tuesday.

Emails exchanged between Jonathan Toebbe and FBI agent posing as representative of unidentified country 

 Email 1:

I hope your experts are very happy with the sample provided and I understand the importance of a small exchange to grow our trust. Most of the material I possess is similar in format — multiple pages per sheet. Drafted drawings are split over several regular sheets to preserve good detail. And I used color where it seemed important — like graphs with several lines. 

I expect your new communication instructions will be just as clear and safe as your drop instructions. However, I suggest you continue to monitor your Proton until I am able to establish contact with your new method. If there is a problem, I will use it to request help. All of my previous emails have been signed: 

Yours truly, Alice 

If it is ever necessary to Proton you again, I will end the email with Sincerely, Alice 

instead to assure you the message is from me and that Jam not under duress. 

For now, I propose we continue with weekend exchanges at suitable parks and trails, similar to this one. Details of my daily routine may narrow an investigator’s search too much of your organization is infiltrated by an adversary one day. Hiking and visiting historical sites is easier to explain than unexpected stops during rush hour if they ever take a special interest in me. 

If we are to continue using this method of exchange long term, it is very important that I have as much flexibility in timing my deliveries as possible. I would like to create a natural legendfor my interest in visiting a particular place in the future — reading articles about ten fun things to do in Baltimore this month and ‘stumbling’ across a beautiful hike close to home, for example. Bad weather on one day might ruin that cover story. 

I hope you will forgive my excess caution. I want our relationship to be very successful for us both, and that means that I must be very careful at every step. 

Yours truly, 

Alice 

Email 2: 

You can not imaging [sic] my relief at finding your letter just where you told me to look! Indeed~ this has been a long journey and Jam very happy to have a reliable professional partner in you. Jam sure my unconventional approach was worrying your superiors. Thank you for taking the risks you have to build the mutual trust we need to move forward. 

I appreciate your compliment of my efforts to secure our communication. It was very challengingfor an amateur to quietly gather information on how to reach you. Now that we have established a more secure method to write, please tell me if I make a mistake or if you have advice on how to accomplish a task so that I can improve my skills and reduce our shared risk. For example, thank you for the reminder to use cash only. I have been doing so at every step, and do not feel insulted at all. Since my seif education is sure to have gaps, it is likely I will not know all things that are simple and obvious to you. 

You have anticipated my need for flexibility in timing deliveries perfectly. Use of the new Proton with the code method in your letter is a good solution. My new Proton is actually an old one I established quietly with a cash only burner phone while on vacation several years ago. My original contact plan was to give the login details to you, but I abandoned it as needlessly complicated. So it has been unused ever since for any purpose except to sign up for a few innocent~, randomly chosen mailing lists to generate regular uninteresting traffic. I will continue to use public WiFi and the TOR .onion connection to Proton to prevent an adversary from watching TOR entrance/exit nodes. 

In your letter you requested I send two Protons: one with the Monero address and one with the decryption key. On the last SD card, I included the Monero address in the unencrypted file 1.txt. My idea was: your payment for the right amount to the right address tells me you successfully retrieved the card, and my sending the key tells you I have received your letter and payment and am ready to take the next step. The only small advantage to my plan is you do not need to wait for my Proton with address. Is there a reason it is safer to send address separate from encrypted data? I will follow the plan in your letter unless you think it is better to change.

As I said in my last letter I hope your experts are very happy with the sample provided. In total, Ipossess the following documents: 

1. [REDACTED] 374 pages (4 pages per shee4 as with sample). Note the table of contents indicates there are additional sections [REDACTED]. They were not included in files I had normal access to since they relate mostly to the reactor heavy equipment and there was no plausible reason for me to request them in my job. As this document is only a high level summary of the [REDACTED] design, the missing sections are of little importance. 

2. [REDACTED] 1032 sheets. Every page of every drawing listed in section [REDA CTED] is there. To preserve good detail~ I scaled the drawings to fit one large drawing page over several normal sheets. All [REDACTED] are present. 

3. [REDA CTED] 7919 pages (4 pages per sheet). The [REDA CTED] reports the detailed results of all [REDACTED] done to predict the behavior of the [REDACTED] during normal [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] also documents the design basis assumptions used to carry out these analyses. Your technical experts should be able to use this information and the [REDACTED] to ver~5~’ the results using their own [REDACTED] codes. 

4. [REDACTED] 1940 sheets — a mix of schematics and drawings (spread over multiple sheets for legibility,), operating procedure (2 pages per sheet), and descriptive chapters (4 pages per sheet). The [REDACTED] is the [REDACTED] provided to US. Navy crews. How to operate [REDACTED]. How to [REDACTED]. Troubleshooting problems. Routine Maintenance. Your naval experts will be able to adapt these procedures to fit your own operations. Operating a [REDACTED] has many unique aspects, and the [REDACTED] reflects decades of US. Navy ‘lessons learned’ that will help keep your sailors safe. 

5. [REDACTED]. Similar informat and scope to the [REDACTED] they are high level summaries. I did not have access to more detailed files for these projects. But I think you are most interested in the [REDACTED] data anyway.

This information was slowly and carefully collected over several years in the normal course of my job to avoid attracting attention and smuggled past security checkpoints a few pages at a time. I no longer have access to classifIed data so unfortunately cannot help you obtain other files. But I can answer your experts questions using my own knowledge, if we can establish a secure and confidential means of communication. 

I have divided the [REDACTED] into fifty one packages, all but the last have 100 sheets each. The first contains the [REDACTED] and the first of the drawings. If l understand your letter correctly, you offer an additional 70,000 USD Monero for the [REDACTED]. I propose the same payment schedule for the remaining files: JOQ,000 USD Monero each for the 49 packages, not additional for 51. In total: 5,000,000 USD Monero.

 The amount per transaction is, in part a security measure. As you noted in your letter, US. security forces are lazy. They also have limited budgets. Bait of] 0,000 or 20,000 USD to catch an agent are within their normal activities. 100,000 USD and more? They may offer it, but they will not deliver such a large amount. New reports confirm this is a common tactic used by US. security forces to expose agents. Please do not be offended by this, but your generosity so far also matches exactly an adversaries [sic] likely play to entrap me. 

We can exchange multiple packages at a time, if your superiors are comfortable with this arrangement. For security, I would strongly prefer not to make 50 separate drops to complete our business. But I understand you will want experts to evaluate the delivery. Maybe best to start with 1 package and increase as our trust grows? I suggest a simple code sent through Proton: email me the number of packages you want at the next drop. ‘1 ‘for just the [REDACTED], ‘2 ‘for the [REDACTED] and another package, and so forth. 

Myfriend, we have both taken considerable risks to reach this point and with good luck will soon have much to celebrate! 

Yours truly, 

Alice  

Email 3: 

First: l am very sorry for the confusion about this drop! When I first read your.. letter, I didn’t check what day of the week your proposed date was and assumed it was a Saturday. I was horrified to notice this detail while rereading your letter to walk through the exchange location one last time before sleeping. I hope my amateurish mistake caused you no serious trouble. 

When I looked at your proposed drop site on a map, I was at first very alarmed. Considering the rules you explained for selecting a location, it does not seem to be in a very good neighborhood. However, I place my faith in your experience and hope for a happy outcome. 

I have considered the possible need to leave on short notice. Should that ever become necessary, I will be forever grateful for your help extracting me and my family. I surmise the first step would be unannounced travel to a safe third country with plans to meet your colleagues. We have passports and cash set aside for this purpose. Ipray such a drastic plan will never be needed, but you are right: it is a comfort to know you are ready and willing to aid us. Please let me know what I should do to prepare for this last resort. 

You asked if I am working alone. There is only one other person I know is aware of our special relationship, and I trust that person absolutely. I was extremely careful to gather the files Ipossess slowly and naturally in the routine of my job, so nobody would suspect my plan. We received training on warning signs to spot insider threats. We made very sure not to display even a single one. I do not believe any of my former colleagues would suspect me, if there is a future investigation.

The previous two exchanges were easy to find thanks to your excellent guidance. Based on the photos of this one, I am sure I had no trouble finding it to put this letter in your hands. I am nervous that this one is further and more obviously off the typical path. 

If I am observed~ an explanation will be more difficult. Jam sure it is a balance, to ensure the container is not found accidentally. But too far from the trail exposes you and me to another risk of not appearing as natural tourists or joggers. For similar reasons, [the south-central Pennsylvania location] made me uncomfortable with only one logical parking area for a motorist and a literal observation tower overlooking the path start. I would prefer future drops to have multz~le natural entrances and exits so that I can plan my own approach and retreat more easily. I hope this does not sound to you as overly critical. I am sure a professional would have no trouble, but Jam painfully aware that I lack training in observation and blending in. Staying outside cities is very wise — let us continue with locations with [sic] an hour of Baltimore. 

I understand your instructions on the use of overlapping Protons and the short signals we can use. Thanks to my mistake on the date, we have both made use of it. I also emailed the payment address to limit the number of times I go out to connect to public WiFi. Rest assured, I always use a TO]? onion connection to Proton, and never use a coffee shop or store close to home. 

Although I am not positioned to acquire more documents than those listed in my last letter I was serious in my offer to help address questions from your technical experts. I hope your letter, or your next will suggest how to open a secure channel for that aid. 

Thank you for your partnership as well, my friend. One day, when it is safe, perhaps two old friends will have a chance to stumble into each other at a cafe, share a bottle of wine and laugh over stories of their shared exploits. A fine thought, but I agree that our mutual need for security may make that impossible. Whether we meet or no [sic], I will always remember your bravery in serving your country and your commitment to helping me. 

Yours truly, 

Alice