Analysis: What created the new, more aggressive Putin
For a better understanding of how we got to this point, and what could come next, I talked to Michael Kimmage, a professor at the Catholic University of America. He specializes in US-Russia relations and is a voice for engagement with Russia and a more nuanced view of the country.
Our conversation, conducted by email and lightly edited, is below.
WHAT MATTERS: Let’s start with a very general question. If the Cold War was about US capitalism vs. USSR communism, what is the standoff between Russia and the West about today?
KIMMAGE: It is less sweeping than the Cold War. It is, at its core, a contest for influence in Eastern and Central Europe. The Cold War, by contrast, was defined by the Iron Curtain. The military situation was mostly settled after 1949. That is why ideological conflict (over capitalism and democracy) was so intense; it was the real arena of competition.
Today, there is no Iron Curtain in Europe. There is no clear line dividing Russia from Europe, or Europe from Russia. And in this ambiguous situation there is a stark difference of vision or of worldview.
The United States sees the individual states of Europe as entirely sovereign and as entitled to make their own decisions about security, trade, alliances, etc.
Russia sees itself as having a privileged zone of interest along its western border. For reasons of security and of prestige, Russia demands in this area a combination of influence and deference, and Russia is willing to employ military force where it sees itself as thwarted in this privileged zone.
Is this the end of the West?
KIMMAGE: Not at all. The alliance has always been a bit unruly.
For a while, France formally distanced itself from NATO — during the Cold War. And the early 1980s witnessed massive protests in Germany and elsewhere about US missile deployments in Europe. Both the Vietnam and the Iraq wars elicited major differences of opinion among the many NATO member states. So there’s nothing new about differing agendas and approaches within NATO.
In addition, NATO has communicated to Russia that it will not make concessions. It will not move back to where it was in 1997, as Vladimir Putin has demanded of NATO. It will not close the open-door policy on membership, and it will not rule out the possibly of accepting Ukraine into the alliance. On the substantive issues, NATO has shown an impressive degree of unity in the last three months.
What should NATO look like in the future?
WHAT MATTERS: The US and NATO countries formally rejected Russia’s demand that Ukraine be barred from entering NATO. Should NATO still be in the business of expanding into Eastern Europe?
KIMMAGE: In my opinion, NATO should no longer be in the business of expanding into Eastern Europe. This is already NATO’s de facto policy regarding Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, which are the three Eastern European countries that could conceivably join NATO.
Moldova features a frozen conflict, and in Moldova there is a Russian military presence.
In a different sense, the alliance already has 30 members. It has a massive, jagged and unstable eastern border. With each new addition come new military commitments, and the alliance will face serious challenges in the future defending those countries that are already members.
Setting limits can be painful. It entails saying no to partners and friends. It carries its own risks. But it is time for NATO to limit itself — not for Russia’s sake but for the sake of its own coherence and for its own capacities of self-defense.
Why is this standoff over Ukraine different?
KIMMAGE: This is a difficult question. One might add to it the quasi-annexation of Belarus that Russia has conducted in the past year. That too is a problem. I think the key point here is that both Georgia after 2008 and Ukraine after 2014 retained their basic sovereignty, damaged as it was by Russia’s annexation of territory. And of course neither Georgia nor Ukraine is an ally of the US or of NATO, which makes military action only a remote policy option, if it’s an option at all.
There are two concerns going forward that may change the equation. One is salami slicing on Russia’s part. How many borders can Moscow change before they simply begin redrawing the map of Europe, and that is certainly one worry about a wider war in Ukraine. If left unopposed, even the annexation of a small bit of territory in Ukraine would be leading in a dangerous direction.
How has Putin changed?
WHAT MATTERS: Putin’s approach to diplomacy, you have noted, has changed over the past year. What’s new and what caused the change?
KIMMAGE: Putin’s diplomatic style is newly aggressive, newly confrontational and newly rushed. He is issuing ultimatums, behaving rudely and acting as if he needs to get answers immediately, which is unusual for diplomacy in general and for Russian diplomacy in particular. I can only speculate about the reasons for this.
It is one part self-confidence or hubris: Putin commands immense military power and has shown that he is willing to use it (in Ukraine, in Georgia, in Syria, etc.). He believes, not without reason, that this degree of military power gives him leverage. And he also thinks that there is a disparity between the leverage he has (in Ukraine and elsewhere) and the degree of respect he is shown by the West.
It is also one part a low opinion of the West that is driving his behavior: He claims to believe that the West is in decline, that it is not what it used to be, that American foreign policy in particular is a record of overreach and failure (Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.), that the United States is internally divided and less committed to European security than it says it is — and that Europe as such, whether the European Union or the individual European states, is weak, lacking in organized military power and deathly afraid of military conflict, such that the threat of this conflict may succeed in garnering concessions for Russia.
More than his Western counterparts, Putin thinks that the world has changed in the last 10 years or so, to Russia’s benefit and to the detriment of the West. In a sense, the tables are turning.
Does Biden have enough leverage?
WHAT MATTERS: President Joe Biden has promised that US troops will not become directly involved in a Russia-Ukraine war. Does the US have enough leverage to keep Russia out of Ukraine?
And the diplomatic leverage that the US has, the leverage that might keep Russia out of Ukraine, entails giving in to Russia, which is absolutely not what Biden wants to do or what Biden will do.
If Putin does not widen the war in Ukraine, it will be because he never intended to do so in the first place; because he sees some cracks in the edifice of the transatlantic relationship; or because he can start getting concessions from the Ukrainian government.
Why should this matter to Americans?
WHAT MATTERS: What would you say to everyday Americans about why Russia and Ukraine matter to them?
KIMMAGE: Ukraine and Russia, in the winter of 2022, matter immensely to Americans. Neither country is a big economic factor for the United States. That is not the source of their relevance.
Ukraine matters for what it is: a large country territorially with some 40 million citizens — and a country to which the United States has, since 2014, made many commitments. The success of Ukraine will be Europe’s success.
And the evisceration of Ukraine, on the battlefield, would lead to a Europe defined more by war than by peace. Throughout the 20th century, the US made many sacrifices on behalf of peace in Europe. That’s now something that hangs in the balance.
Russia matters for what it is: after the United States, the world’s major nuclear power; a linchpin of international politics; a country with Europe’s largest conventional army; and a country with the power to wreak immense harm on the United States and its allies.
It is no longer the Cold War. Not everything hinges on the relationship between Moscow and Washington. But even so, this relationship is fundamental to what happens in Europe, what happens in Asia, what happens in the Middle East.
The United States has to be aware of the challenges and threats Putin’s Russia poses, and at the same time — no easy task — the United States needs to preserve lines of communication with Russia, needs to engage in careful diplomacy with Russia, needs to find a way of dealing with a country that because of its nuclear arsenal cannot be defeated and with a country whose population is not hostile to the United States.
Ukraine and Russia are two separate balls. They’re hard to juggle at the same time, but juggle them the Biden administration must. There is no big margin of error.
